Papers - John A List

John A List, Robert D Metcalfe, Michael K Price, Florian Rundhammer

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The literature has shown the power of social norms to promote residential energy conservation, particularly among high usage users. This study uses a natural field experiment with nearly 200,000 US households to explore whether a financial rewards program can complement such approaches. We observe strong impacts of financial rewards, particularly amongst low-usage and low-variance households, customers who typically are less responsive to normative messaging. Our data thus suggest important policy complementarities between behavioral and financial incentives: whereas non-pecuniary interventions disproportionally affect intense users, financial incentives are able to affect substantially low-user, "sticky households."

John A List, Anya Samek, Dana L Suskind

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Behavioral economics and field experiments within the social sciences have advanced well beyond academic curiosum. Governments around the globe as well as the most powerful firms in modern economies employ staffs of behavioralists and experimentalists to advance and test best practices. In this study, we combine behavioral economics with field experiments to reimagine a new model of early childhood education. Our approach has three distinct features. First, by focusing public policy dollars on prevention rather than remediation, we call for much earlier educational programs than currently conceived. Second, our approach has parents at the center of the education production function rather than at its periphery. Third, we advocate attacking the macro education problem using a public health methodology, rather than focusing on piecemeal advances.

Jeffrey A Flory, Andreas Leibbrandt, John A List

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Workplace misbehaviors are often governed by explicit monitoring and strict punishment. Such enforcement activities can serve to lessen worker productivity and harm worker morale. We take a different approach to curbing worker misbehavior-bonuses. Examining more than 6500 donor phone calls across more than 80 workers, we use a natural field experiment to investigate how different wage contracts influence workers' propensity to break workplace rules in harmful ways. Our findings show that even though standard relative performance pay contracts, relative to a fixed wage scheme, increase productivity, they have a dark side: they cause considerable cheating and sabotage of co-workers. Yet, even in such environments, by including an unexpected bonus, the employer can substantially curb worker misbehavior. In this manner, our findings reveal how employers can effectively leverage bonuses to eliminate undesired behaviors induced by performance pay contracts.

Glenn W Harrison, John A List

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No abstract available

Shachar Kariv, Daniel J. Lee, John A List, Michael K Price

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We build on previous work in the charitable giving literature by examining not only how much subjects give to charity, but also which charities subjects prefer. We operationalize this choice in an artefactual field experiment with a representative sample of respondents. We then use these data to structurally model motives for giving. The novelty of this design allows us to ask several interesting questions regarding the choices one undertakes when deciding both whether and how much to give to charity. Further, we ask these questions in the context of a standard utility framework. Given the unique set up of this experiment, we also explore how these distributional preference parameters differ by charity choice and from what we have observed in the past. We find that there is more variation within demographics and charity types than across distributions.

Erwin Bulte, Aart de Zeeuw, Shelby Gerking, John A List

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Measuring preferences via stated methods remains the only technique to obtain the total economic value of a non-marketed good or service. This study examines if alternative causes of an environmental problem affect individual statements of compensation demanded. Making use of a unique sample drawn from the Netherlands, we find that Hicksian equivalent surplus (ES) is not significantly affected by causes of environmental harm. While our finding that agents only care about outcomes, rather than causes, is consonant with standard applications of utility theory, it is at odds with some recent experimental findings measuring the effects of cause on Hicksian compensating surplus (CS).

Charles Godward , John A List, Mark Thompson

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Anne Alexander , Ralph d'Arge , John A List, Michael Margolis

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The goal of this paper is to provide an investigation of several approaches to valuing ecosystem services and to contribute additional techniques which may be used in evaluating 'green' GDP accounts. Our estimates focus on the ecosystem as a productive economic input, not a stock which is depreciated or depleted over time; as such, it differs with other concepts more frequently employed in green GDP accounting. Most of our results are derived from the analytical fiction that a single owner of the biosphere establishes a market for all ecological resources. This monopolist then appropriates all rents from the human population. The maximum amount the monopolist charges is first assumed to be world gross product less the global human subsistence level. In addition, we examine the excess rents available in factor markets using the assumption of weak complementarity between factor inputs and ecosystem services. We also provide more conservative estimates of the value of ecosystem services by investigating the sustainable price the monopolist could charge the global population and by exploring the effects of compensating wage differentials and a non-monopolist owner of the ecosystem.

John A List

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Given the importance of job placement for Ph.D.s, it is surprising that economists have not closely examined the factors that affect procuring job interviews for new Ph.D. economists.' In this study, I investigated those factors using a data set gathered at the 1997 American Economic Association (AEA) meetings in New Orleans. My purpose was to increase the information available to Ph.D. candidates who wish to maximize their postgraduation job prospects. In addition, this study may guide undergraduates and master's candidates who seek to pursue a Ph.D. in economics. The results of the findings, however, could benefit more than job seekers-they may provide academic departments and private industry with a comparative baseline for making decisions to interview job candidates. The job market for new Ph.D.s consists of two submarkets-academic and businesshndustry. The following are questions regarding job seekers in both submarkets. (1) Do employers in academia seek the same attributes as businesshndustry? (2) Is there discrimination in the interview decision? (3) Is an MBA important in the Ph.D. market? (4) How many more interviews are secured by candidates with a finished dissertation? (5) How important are teaching and research credentials? (6) Are graduates from top-ranked programs given special consideration in the job market? (7) Do personal letters of recommendation or calls from professors make a difference in the interview decision? (8) How influential are recommendation letters from prestigious economists? (9) What is the marginal effect of submitting another application? A simple theoretic construct provides a basis for understanding the two-step job-search process carried out by new Ph.D. economists.* In the first step, the job seeker decides whether to enter one or both submarkets and determines the optimal number of applications to submit. The second step reflects the actual decision process regarding acceptance or rejection of a job offer. Because a natural prerequisite to securing a job is an initial interview, my main focus in this study was to discover the optimal job search strategies for new Ph.D. economists by determining applicant characteristics that are conducive to obtaining interviews.

John A List, Warren McHone

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In this article, we use annual (1980-90) county-level manufacturing plant location data for New York State to examine the effects of the 1977 Clean Air Act Amendments on the location decisions of new pollution-intensive manufacturing plants in the "neo-regulatory" (1980-84) and "mature-regulatory" (1985-90) phases of the Act's implementation. Our results suggest that the temporal effects of regulation vary. Whereas the location decisions of pollution intensive manufacturing firms were unaffected by the Act's regulatory restrictions in the "neo-regulatory" period, the restrictions appear to have had a significant negative impact on the location decisions of these types of firms in the Act's "mature-regulatory" phase. The diversion of new pollution intensive plants to counties with less stringent environmental regulations suggests that current US environmental regulations may be leading to a "browning process" whereby counties historically free of pollution become havens for polluters.

Craig Gallet, John A List

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This paper uses market share data to infer the nature of rivalry in the U.S. cigarette industry over the 1934-94 period. Unlike previous studies, which measure rivalry from various constructs of market share instability, we examine the time-series properties of market shares to determine whether or not rivalry is evident. Our empirical results imply that a majority of firm-level market shares are martingales, suggesting market shares have been unstable from 1934-94. This result leads us to conclude that rivalry in the cigarette industry has remained strong.

Vic Adamowicz, Jonathan E Alevy, John A List

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Psychological insights have made inroads within most major areas of study in economics. One area where less advance has been made is environmental and resource economics. In this study, we examine the implications of preference reversals over evaluation modes, in which stated economic values critically depend on whether the good is valued jointly with others or in isolation. The question arises because two commonly used methods for eliciting stated preferences differ in that one presents objects together and another presents objects to be evaluated in isolation. Beyond showing an example of the import of behavioral economics, our empirical evidence sheds new light on the factors associated with insensitivity of valuations to the scope of the good

John A List, Charles F Mason

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Are individuals expected utility maximizers? This question represents much more than academic curiosity. In a normative sense, at stake are the fundamental underpinnings of the bulk of the last half-century's models of choice under uncertainty. From a positive perspective, the ubiquitous use of benefit-cost analysis across government agencies renders the expected utility maximization paradigm literally the only game in town. In this study, we advance the literature by exploring CEO's preferences over small probability, high loss lotteries. Using undergraduate students as our experimental control group, we find that both our CEO and student subject pools exhibit frequent and large departures from expected utility theory. In addition, as the extreme payoffs become more likely CEOs exhibit greater aversion to risk. Our results suggest that use of the expected utility paradigm in decision making substantially underestimates society's willingness to pay to reduce risk in small probability, high loss events.

Richard Damania, Per Fredriksson , John A List

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This study uses a three-stage common agency model to explore the linkages between trade policy, corruption and environmental policy in an imperfect market setting. We show that the effect of trade liberalization on the stringency of environmental policy depends critically on the level of corruption-in relatively corrupt countries, trade openness leads to more stringent environmental policy. In such countries, this interaction, therefore, lends trade liberalization a type of "multiplier effect," raising both economic growth and environmental policy stringency.

Junsoo Lee, John A List

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Despite its growth in other areas of economics,time series econometric methods have not been widespread in the area of environmental and resource economics. We illustrate one use of time series methods by examining the time path of US nitrogen oxide (NOx) emission data over the period 1900-1994. The analysis highlights that proper time series methods can aid in optimal regulatory policy as well as developing empirical verification of theories put forth to explain economic phenomena. In addition, several interesting results emerge. First, we find that the emissions series contains both a permanent and random component. Second, if one attributed all of the emissions reductions to regulatory policy, intervention analysis suggests that the 1970 Clean Air Act(CAA) did not merely have transitory effects,but permanently influenced the NOx emission path. In terms of total regulatory impact, an upper bound on the emissions saved due to the 1970 CAA is in the range of 27%-48%.

Ted Gayer, John Horowitz, John A List

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Clear Skies is an economist's approach to pollution reduction. We heartily endorse its core approach, while recommending surgery for a few minor blemishes.

John A List

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Recently an abundance of experimental evidence has been gathered that is consonant with the notion that individual preferences are inconsistent and unstable. These empirical results potentially undermine the theoretical foundation of welfare economics, as the degree of preference liability claimed suggests that perhaps no optimization principles underlie even the most straightforward of choices. Yet policymakers in the environmental arena continue to prescribe policies based on economics-based methods that are constructed on the very principles that have been directly refuted. Are policymakers creatures of habit that move at glacial speed or is there something deeper behind their inertness? In this study, I explore this issue within the U.S. context and argue that there is some rationality behind current public policy decision making. I then explore whether the empirical evidence supports the view that policymakers should take preference anomalies seriously. As a case study, I focus on some of my recent findings on preference inconsistencies in the marketplace.

Craig Gallet, John A List, Peter Orazem

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The 1987 academic market was strong, whereas the 1997 market was weak. A multimarket theory of optimal search suggests that job seekers will respond to a weakening market by changing their search strategies at the extensive margin (which markets to enter) and the intensive margin (how many applications to submit per market). Employers respond to the weakening market by raising their hiring standards. High-quality applicants will obtain an increased share of academic interviews in weak markets while applicants from weaker schools will increasingly secure interviews outside of the academic market. Empirical results show that in the bust market, graduates of elite schools shifted their search strategies to include weaker academic institutions, while graduates of lower-ranked schools shifted their applications away from academia and toward the business sector. In bust conditions, academic institutions increasingly concentrate their interviews on elite school graduates, women, and U.S. residents

Junsoo Lee, John A List, Mark Strazicich

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In this paper we examine temporal properties of eleven natural resource real price series from 1870-1990 by employing a Lagrangian Multiplier unit root test that allows for two endogenously determined structural breaks with and without a quadratic trend. Contrary to previous research, we find evidence against the unit root hypothesis for all price series. Our findings support characterizing natural resource prices as stationary around deterministic trends with structural breaks. This result is important in both a positive and normative sense. For example, without an appropriate understanding of the dynamics of a time series, empirical verification of theories, forecasting, and proper inference are potentially fruitless. More generally, we show that both pre-testing for unit roots with breaks and allowing for breaks in the forecast model can improve forecast accuracy.

Steven D Levitt, John A List, Sally Sadoff

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Although backward induction is a cornerstone of game theory, most laboratory experiments have found that agents are not able to successfully backward induct. We analyze the play of world-class chess players in the centipede game, which is ill-suited for testing backward induction, and in pure backward induction games--Race to 100 games. We find that chess players almost never play the backward induction equilibrium in the centipede game, but many properly backward induct in the Race to 100 games. We find no systematic within-subject relationship between choices in the centipede game and performance in pure backward induction games.