Papers - John A List
Omar Al-Ubaydli,
John A List,
Danielle LoRe,
Dana L Suskind
Cited by*: 1 Downloads*: 7 
No abstract available
James Edwards,
John A List
Cited by*: 1 Downloads*: 0
People respond to those who ask. Within the charitable fundraising community, the power of the ask represents the backbone of most fundraising strategies. Despite this, the optimal design of communication strategies has received less formal attention. For their part, economists have recently explored how communication affects empathy, altruism, and giving rates to charities. Our study takes a step back from this literature to examine how suggestions-a direct ask for a certain amount of money-affect giving rates. We find that our suggestion amounts affect both the intensive and extensive margins: more people give and they tend to give the suggested amount. Resulting insights help us understand why people give, why messages work, and deepen practitioners' understanding of how to use messages to leverage more giving.
Uri Gneezy,
John A List,
Jeffrey A Livingston,
Xiangdong Qin,
Sally Sadoff,
Yang Xu
Cited by*: 1 Downloads*: 124
Tests measuring and comparing educational achievement are an important policy tool. We experimentally show that offering students extrinsic incentives to put forth effort on such achievement tests has differential effects across cultures. Offering incentives to U.S. students, who generally perform poorly on assessments, improved performance substantially. In contrast, Shanghai students, who are top performers on assessments, were not affected by incentives. Our findings suggest that in the absence of extrinsic incentives, ranking countries based on low-stakes assessments is problematic because test scores reflect differences in intrinsic motivation to perform well on the test itself, and not just differences in ability.
Ori Heffetz ,
John A List
Cited by*: 1 Downloads*: 14
A hallmark result within behavioral economics is that individuals' choices are affected by current endowments. A recent theory due to Koszegi and Rabin (2006) explains such endowment effect with a model of expectations-based reference-dependent preferences. Departing from past work, we conduct complementary experiments to disentangle expectations - verified probabilistic beliefs held by subjects - from other features of endowment - such as "assignment" to a good - hence allowing us to compare the effect of expectations with that of other variations. While mere assignment can affect choices, we do not find a large role in the effect for Koszegi-Rabin expectations.
Glenn W Harrison,
John A List,
Charles Towe
Cited by*: 1 Downloads*: 29
Does individual behavior in a laboratory setting provide a reliable indicator of behavior in a naturally occurring setting? We consider this general methodological question in the context of eliciting risk attitudes. The controls that are typically employed in laboratory settings, such as the use of abstract lotteries, could lead subjects to employ behavioral rules that differ from the ones they employ in the field. Because it is field behavior that we are interested in understanding, those controls might be a confound in themselves if they result in differences in behavior. We find that the use of artificial monetary prizes provides a reliable measure of risk attitudes when the natural counterpart outcome has minimal uncertainty, but that it can provide an unreliable measure when the natural counterpart outcome has background risk. Behavior tended to be moderately risk averse when artificial monetary prizes were used or when there was minimal uncertainty in the natural nonmonetary outcome, but subjects drawn from the same population were much more risk averse when their attitudes were elicited using the natural nonmonetary outcome that had some background risk. These results are consistent with conventional expected utility theory for the effects of background risk on attitudes to risk.
Daniel J Benjamin,
James O Berger,
Magnus Johannesson,
Brian A Nosek,
E. J Wagenmakers,
Richard Berk,
Kenneth A Bollen,
Bjorn Brembs,
Lawrence Brown,
Colin F Camerer,
David Cesarini,
Christopher D. Chambers,
Merlise Clyde,
Thomas D Cook,
Paul De Boeck,
Zoltan Dienes,
Anna Dreber,
Kenny Easwaran,
Charles Efferson,
Ernst Fehr,
Fiona Fidler,
Andy P. Field,
Malcom Forster,
Edward I. George,
Tarun Ramadorai,
Richard Gonzalez,
Steven Goodman,
Edwin Green,
Donald P Green,
Anthony Greenwald,
Jarrod D. Hadfield,
Larry V. Hedges,
Leonhard Held,
Teck Hau Ho,
Herbert Hoijtink,
James Holland Jones,
Daniel J Hruschka,
Kosuke Imai,
Guido Imbens,
John P.A. Ioannidis,
Minjeong Jeon,
Michael Kirchler,
David Laibson ,
John A List,
Roderick Little,
Arthur Lupia,
Edouard Machery,
Scott E. Maxwell,
Michael McCarthy,
Don Moore,
Stephen L. Morgan,
Marcus Munafo,
Shinichi Nakagawa,
Brendan Nyhan,
Timothy H Parker,
Luis Pericchi,
Marco Perugini,
Jeff Rouder,
Judith Rousseau,
Victoria Savalei,
Felix D. Schonbrodt,
Thomas Sellke,
Betsy Sinclair,
Dustin Tingley,
Trisha Van Zandt,
Simine Vazire,
Duncan J. Watts,
Christopher Winship,
Robert L. Wolpert,
Yu Xie,
Cristobal Young,
Jonathan Zinman,
Valen E. Johnson
Cited by*: 1 Downloads*: 965
We propose to change the default P-value threshold for statistical significance for claims of new discoveries from 0.05 to 0.005.
Francis Larson,
John A List,
Robert D Metcalfe
Cited by*: 1 Downloads*: 61
Behavioral economists have recently put forth a theoretical explanation for the equity premium puzzle based on combining myopia and loss aversion. Complementing the behavioral theory is evidence from laboratory experiments, which provide strong empirical support consistent with myopic loss aversion (MLA). Yet, whether, and to what extent, such preferences underlie behaviors of traders in their natural domain remains unknown. Indeed, a necessary condition for the MLA theory to explain the equity premium puzzle is for marginal traders in markets to exhibit such preferences. Using minute-by-minute trading observations from over 864,000 price realizations in a natural field experiment, we find data patterns consonant with MLA: in their normal course of business, professional traders who receive infrequent price information invest 33% more in risky assets, yielding profits that are 53% higher, compared to traders who receive frequent price information. Beyond testing theory, these results have important implications for efficient resource allocation as well as characterizing the optimal structure of social and economic policies.
Daniel Henderson ,
John A List,
Daniel L Millimet,
Christopher Parmeter ,
Michael K Price
Cited by*: 1 Downloads*: 4
Nonparametric estimators provide a flexible means of uncovering salient features of auction data. Although these estimators are popular in the literature, many key features necessary for proper implementation have yet to be uncovered. Here we provide several suggestions for nonparamteric estimation of first-price auction models. Specifically, we show how to impose monotonicity of the equilibrium bidding strategy; a key property of structural auction models not guaranteed in standard nonparametric estimation. We further develop methods for automatic bandwidth selection. Finally, we discuss how to impose monotonicity in auctions with differering number of bidders, reserve prices, and auction-specific characteristics. Finite sample performance is examined using simulated data as well as experimental auction data.
Richard Engelbrecht-Wiggans,
John A List,
David H Reiley
Cited by*: 1 Downloads*: 4
My coauthors and I reply to the comments of Daniel Levin on our paper "Demand Reduction in Multiunit Auctions: Evidence from a Sportscard Field Experiment." In his comment, Levin presents new theory and proposes a new equilibrium to explain annomalies reported in our earlier sportscard auction, such as higher first-unit bids under the uniform-price institution. We evaluate his theory and equilibrium in the context of both uniform-price and Vickrey auctions and point out our concerns. Where possible, we attempt to test the predictions of his theory with our existing data.
Michael Hallsworth,
John A List,
Robert D Metcalfe,
Ivo Vlaev
Cited by*: 1 Downloads*: 82
Framing remains one of the pillars of behavioral economics. While framing effects have been found to be quite important in the lab, what is less clear is how well evidence drawn from naturally-occurring settings conforms to received laboratory insights. We use debt obligation to the UK government as a case study to explore the 'omission bias' present in decision making with large stakes. Using a natural field experiment that generates nearly 40,000 observations, we find that repayment rates are roughly doubled when the act is reframed as one of commission rather than omission. We estimate that this reframing of the perceived nature of the action generated over $1.3 million of new yield. We find evidence that this behavior may result from a deliberate 'omission strategy', rather than a behavioral bias, as is often assumed in the literature. Our natural field experiment highlights that behavioral economics is much more than a series of empirical exercises to quench the intellectual curiosity of academics.
Uri Gneezy,
Andreas Leibbrandt,
John A List
Cited by*: 1 Downloads*: 9
The functioning and well-being of any society and organization critically hinges on norms of cooperation that regulate social activities. Empirical evidence on how such norms emerge and in which environments they thrive remains a clear void in the literature. To provide an initial set of insights, we overlay a set of field experiments in a natural setting. Our approach is to compare behavior in Brazilian fishermen societies that differ along one major dimension: the workplace organization. In one society (located by the sea) fishermen are forced to work in groups whereas in the adjacent society (located on a lake) fishing is inherently an individual activity. We report sharp evidence that the sea fishermen trust and cooperate more and have greater ability to coordinate group actions than their lake fishermen counterparts. These findings are consistent with the argument that people internalize social norms that emerge from specific needs and support the idea that socio-ecological factors play a decisive role in the proliferation of pro-social behaviors.
Catherine Kling ,
John A List,
Jinhua Zhao
Cited by*: 1 Downloads*: 5
Recent evidence from laboratory experiments suggests that important disparities exist between willingness to pay (WTP) and compensation demanded for the same good. Because a fundamental postulate in neoclassical theory is that with small income effects and many available substitutes, the willingness to accept (WTA) and WTP measures of value for a commodity should be roughly equivalent, this finding has vast implications in both a positive and normative sense. This study advances, and experimentally tests, a new explanation of the WTP/WTA disparity-a dynamic theory based on the presence of commitment costs. Although to date neoclassical models have not explained the observed data patterns well, we find that the commitment cost theory combined with a simple behavioral anomaly is able to lend insights into the causes and severity of the WTA/WTP disparity. Furthermore, we find that market experience attenuates the behavioral anomaly, consistent with the notion that no value disparity exists for agents with sufficient market experience.
John A List,
Yana Peysakhovichc
Cited by*: 1 Downloads*: 5
This paper examines aggregate time series data on individual charitable donations from 1968 to 2007. We find that changes in individual giving show an asymmetric response to changes in the S&P 500: individuals are more responsive to stock market upturns than downturns.
Erwin Bulte,
John A List,
Jason F Shogren
Cited by*: 1 Downloads*: 2
An important public policy question that remains unresolved is whether devolution will enhance sensible policy making by exploiting informational asymmetries or, instead, trigger a "beggar thy neighbor" response and stimulate free riding amongst localities. We analyze this question within the framework of U.S. environmental policy making by scrutinizing a unique panel data set on state-level endangered species expenditure patterns. Our empirical estimates are consistent with the notion that states free ride, which may lead to an expenditure equilibrium that is not Pareto efficient.
Uri Gneezy,
Andreas Leibbrandt,
John A List
Cited by*: 1 Downloads*: 98
Competitiveness pervades life: plants compete for sunlight and water, animals for territory and food, and humans for mates and income. Here we investigate human competitiveness with a natural experiment and a set of behavioral experiments. We compare competitiveness in traditional fishing societies where local natural forces determine whether fishermen work in isolation or in collectives. We find sharp evidence that fishermen from individualistic societies are far more competitive than fishermen from collectivistic societies and that this difference emerges with work experience. These findings suggest that humans can evolve traits to specific needs, support the idea that socio-ecological factors play a decisive role for individual competitiveness, and provide evidence how individualistic and collectivistic societies shape economic behaviour.
Erwin Bulte,
Simon Levin ,
John A List,
Steven Pacala
Cited by*: 1 Downloads*: 2
n/a
Iwan Barankay,
Magnus Johannesson,
John A List,
Richard Friberg,
Matti Liski,
Kjetil Storesletten
Cited by*: 1 Downloads*: 1
No abstract available
John A List,
Zacharias Maniadis,
Fabio Tufano
Cited by*: 0 Downloads*: 3
In his comment, Mitesh Kataria (2014) makes three main points about a
specific part of our paper (Maniadis, Tufano, and List 2014), namely about Tables
2 and 3. In our paper, we employ these tables in order to illustrate the idea that
very inconclusive post-study probabilities that a tested phenomenon is true may
result from novel, surprising findings. The main arguments in Kataria (2014) are
the following:
First, if P(H0) is unknown, as is often the case with economic
applications, the post-study probability can lead to even worse
inference than the Classical significance test, depending on the quality
of the prior. Second, the simulation in Maniadis et al. (2014) ignores
previous assessments of P(H0) and instead utilizes a selective empirical
setup that favors the use of post-study probabilities. [Third,]
contrary to what Maniadis et al. (2014) argue, their results do not allow
for drawing general recommendations about which approach is the
most appropriate. (Kataria 2014, abs.)
We believe that our work might have been misunderstood by Kataria.
Moreover, it seems that some of his claims are not supported by relevant empirical
evidence.
Erwin Bulte,
John A List,
Qin Tu
Cited by*: 0 Downloads*: 32
A vibrant literature has emerged that explores the economic implications of the sex ratio (the ratio of men to women in the population), including changes in fertility rates, educational outcomes, labor supply, and household purchases. Previous empirical efforts, however, have paid less attention to the underlying channel via which changes in the sex ratio affect economic decisions. This study combines evidence from a field experiment and a survey to document that the sex ratio importantly influences female bargaining power: as the sex ratio increases, female bargaining power increases.
James Andreoni,
John A List
Cited by*: 0 Downloads*: 8
No abstract available