Papers - Abigail Barr

Abigail Barr

Cited by*: 4 Downloads*: 8

This paper presents rigorous and direct tests of two assumptions relating to limited commitment and asymmetric information that underpin current models of risk pooling. A specially designed economic experiment involving 678 subjects across 23 Zimbabwean villages is used to solve the problems of observability and quantification that have frustrated previous attempts to conduct such tests. I find that more extrinsic commitment is associated with more risk pooling, but that more information is associated with less risk pooling. The first of these results accords with our expectations and assumptions. The second does not. I offer two explanations as to the origin of the second result and discuss their implications for how we view the assumptions made elsewhere in the literature. I also conduct a test of the relevance or external validity of the experimental results to our understanding of real risk pooling behaviour. In four out of the five villages for which the test could be conducted the networks of risk pooling contracts constructed during the experiment and the networks existing in real life were significantly correlated.

Abigail Barr, Truman G Packard

Cited by*: 1 Downloads*: 9

Exploiting new data from a survey and behavioral experiment conducted in Peru we analyze individuals' preferences for securing income in old age. We identify a group that is unrationed by the mandate to save in Peru's pension system, and draw insights from their affiliation and contribution behavior. Among the unrationed, those who are more tolerant of risk, have more children, and have a greater share of housing in their accumulated assets are less likely to affiliate and/or contribute to the formal pensions system. Further, the less risk tolerant choose private individual retirement accounts over a publicly administered pension system.

Abigail Barr, Jose Garcia-Montalvo, Magnus Lindelow, Pieter Serneels

Cited by*: 4 Downloads*: 11

We explore the value of the strategy method to field experimentalists. Specifically, we demonstrate that, while the method may lead to reductions in subject understanding, it also generates valuable insights. We played the Third Party Punishment Game and the Generalized Trust Game with Ethiopian medical and nursing students applying the strategy method to the responding role in each case. Then, making use of two proxy measures for the students` cognitive abilities, we investigate the relationship between strategy-type choices and subject understanding. Thus, we find support for the assertion that apparently random and internally inconsistent strategies are symptomatic of problems of cognition. We also find support for the often, implicitly made assumption that, in BDM-type trust games, the ratio of what is returned to what is sent is an appropriate focus for comparative analyses of responder behaviour. Finally, we find evidence that an observed difference in third party punishing behaviour between Swiss and Ethiopian students is due, not to misunderstanding, but to variations in what is perceived as punishable. Our results lead us to conclude that the strategy method is of considerable value in Third Party Punishment Games, but need not be routinely applied in BDM-type trust games.